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Phillip Iohnson, in a number of recent writings, most notably in his
1991 book, Darwin on Trial. has called into question the whole of evolutionary science by arguing that it is based on the philosophical system of naturalism which assumes without justification that God plays no part in the
process by which living things come to be.' The philosopher, Robert
Pennock, in his recent book, 7bwer ofBabel: The Evidence against the New
Creationism, defends science against Johnson's charge, arguing first that
naturalism is not atheistic and so does not deny God, and second, that the
principle naturalism uses to keep God out of science is adopted for good
methodological reasons.2 I want to enter into this discussion between
Johnson and Pennock about the relation between (naturalistic) evolutionary
theory and theism. I will ask: Does evolutionary naturalism. rule out the theistic God? If so, how? Is the ruling out a metaphysical claim (that God does
not exist) or merely a methodological rule that disallows supernatural explanations? Is the ruling out logical or probabilistic? Other points of disagreement between Johnson and Pennock I will consider, although less fully. are
framed by questions such as the following; Can the two explanatory
I Phillip E. Johnson, Darwin on 1Hal (Washington, IX: R.egnery Gateway, 1991); 2nd ed.
(Downel'5 Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993) The second edition includes in its epilogue a
response to the reviewers and critics of the first edmon. RefemH.:es to this WOJk (abbreviated
Dl) arc Included In text and arc 10 the second edition.
2 Robert T. Pennock, 7bwer of Babel: The evidence against the New Creationism
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999). Refereoc:es 10 this work are abbreviated in text as TB.
The work incorporates the essentials of earlier cntique of Iohnson: wNanuaiism, Evidence
and Creationism: The CIISC of Phillip Johnson.," Biology and Philosophy 1t (1996): 543-59;
Johnson responds in "Response to Pennock," Biology and Philosophy 11 (1996): 561-3.
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"hypotheses" (God and e\'olutionary principles) be made compatible (for
elUlmple, in the way that "If:i.~ti(: (!\·u/utiolliM.<; havc tried to combine them)?
Is Johnson right that there is a fundamental opposition between them? Can
the theistic hypothesis be brought into science and be part of a scientific
explanation of life-forms (as Johnson thinks). or docs religion belong wholly to another sphere of life outside of science (as Pennock thinks)? Lastly.
how should theologians think of the theistic God and its activity in relation
to the natural order that science describes?
Docs evolutionary theory rule out the theistic God? Johnson's answer is
a resounding Yes. To understand this, we need, first, to see what Johnson
means by the theistic God. Although he docs not adhcre to a strict definition.
we can tell contextually that he is referring to a being (a) who creates the
natural order; (b) guides it according to a plan or purpose; (c) enters into
meaningful rdalion!>hips with his creatures; and {possibly} (d) intervenes in
nature's processes in order to effect his purposes.
To sec why Johnson thinks that evolutionary science conflicts with this
God. we have to look at his philosophical argument against naturalism.
Pennock has brought out nicely that Johnson attacks science on two fronts,
the philosophical and the empirical, and while Pennock responds to both
arguments, hc thinks the philosophical charge is innovative and "does the
real work" (TD, 188). In this discussion, I am going to focus mainly on
Johnson's philosophical arguments against naturalism.
The philosophical charge begins with the idea that science as a whole
rests on the philosophical system of naturalism. The basic "assumption" of
this naturalistic system is that natural causes are ruled in, and the supernatural God is ruled out. That is, it is just assumed, a priori (as Johnson often puts
it), that God is not causally active in the natural process and so is excluded
from consideration as a possible explanation of natural events. And the special science of evolutionary biology, based on this same naturalistic system,
similarly rules out God as a possible explanation of biological phenomena.
Further, naturalism adopts a particular mC!taphysical system that holds
that matter and energy arc "all there is." On this interpretation, which we
might call strong lIalur{lIi.~m. God is ruled out not only as an explanatory
entity, but as an existing entity.
According to naturalism, what is ultimately real is nature, which consists of the fundamental particles thaI make up what we call matter
and energy, together with the natural laws that govern how those particles behave. Nature itself is ultimately all there is, at least as far as
we arc concerned. To put it another way, nature is a permanently
closed system of material callses and effccts that can never be influenced by anything outside of itself-by God, for example. '
1 I'lnllip E. jolm.~on. R,·t1.wm ill /1Ii! IJII1ml<'<'; 7111! Cu.w oWJill.l/ NUII/To/mn III Science, Luw,
u"d EtI"cullol/ (Downcrs Grove. IL: IlltcrVarsily Press. 1995).37·8.
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In this passage we can see Johnson trying to hold together two very different views of what naturalism implies about God. The strong naturalistic
claim is atheistic and flatly denies that any supernatural being exists. But a
more moderate naturalistic claim is suggested that God may exist outside of
nature, but whether he does or not makes no difference to humans since, as
far as our knowledge is concerned, he does not (or cannot) intervene in the
natural realm. It is clear that Johnson often describes naturalism in a way
that runs together these two incompatible versions of it. This may be because
he tends to equate evolutionary naturalism with the views of some atheistic
critics of creationism, such as Richard Dawkins. Be that as it may, Johnson
does in some places admit that "naturalism does not explicitly deny the mere
existence of God" (DT, 116.17), and so in this discussion we will take him
to be arguing against the moderate fonn of naturalism which allows that a
God may exist in some form. However even the moderate fonn seems to
have no place for the theistic God which is conceived as taking an active pilTt
in nature and in human affairs.
What is most important about naturalism then, for Johnson, is the principle or premise that allows only certain kinds of materialistic causal explanations and disallows all supernatural ones. 4 Moreover, Johnson thinks that
this exclusionary principle is itself a metaphysical or philosophical assertion
without any basis in fact. It is an a priori assumption-not in the philosophical sense of being grounded in reason alone, but in the popular sense of
being arbitary or reflecting an individual's (or a group's) subjective preferences or prejudices. It is a "doctrine" or "dogma" or "ideology" and thus
ultimately not open to rational debate. Furthermore, Johnson believes that if
evolutionary theorists would only disabuse themselves of this exclusivist
principle and open themselves to the possibility that God is the cause of
complex biological phenomena, they would then be able to see that the
observable evidence runs against them, and rather points in the direction of
an intelligent cause.
Johnson thinks that the metaphysical assumptions of naturalism extend
even further into evolutionary theory and include the basic principles of
mutation and natural selection. The claim that these principles arc metaphysical and nonempirical is meant to bolster his empirical argument that
they are not supported by observational evidence.
Natural selection exists, to be sure, but no one has evidence that it can
accomplish anything remotely resembling the creative acts thal
Darwinists attribute to it. ... As an explanation for modifications in
• It is not important for Johnson what malenal things sciencc posits as ontologlcally rcalfor examplc, whether they include particles, forces or fields. Nor does he develop the Implications for theism of lite fact that only matcrial or physicalisllc things are positcd. All that malters to him is that these things do not include supcrnatural beings.
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populations, Darwinism is an empirical doctrine. As an explanation
for how complex orgaDisms came into eXistence in the first place, it
is pure philosophy. (DT, 117)
The philosophically imponant part of the Darwinian theory-its
mechanism for creating complex things that did not exist before-is
therefore not really part of empirical science at all, but rather a deduction from nalurali!otic philosophy. (DT, 158)

Unfortunately, Johnson does not go on to specify how the "mechanism
for creating complex things that did not exist before"-the mechanism of
chance variation and natural selection is a "deduction from naturalistic philosophy." Darwin's chosen mechanism certainly could not be deduced from
the assumption that life fonns have a naturalistic and not a supernaturalistic
explanation. But in other places, Johnson fonnulates the point differently:
The conflict betwecn Darwinism and theism arises because the [evolutionary hypothc!lis] is a product of naturalistic philosophy, not observation or-experiment. ... [W]c have no good reason to suppose that
Darwinian selection was thc mechanism of creation unless we make
the naturalistic assumption that nature had to do its own creating.'

The idea is that since God was ruled out, then evolutionary theorists had to
operate on the assumption that na/llre had to do its own creating, and so they
devised the principles of mutation and natural selection. The point seems
most plausible if construed as a claim about what motivated the originator(s)
of the theory. Possibly Johnson is arguing that Darwin himself cast aside the
intelligent-designer hypothesis that was prevalent in the theologicatIy-based
science of his time, and then searched for a different one to take its place.
On this view, Darwin's entire project stems from his initial assumption that
God's intentions and special acts should IIot be allowed as explanations of
natural life. We can imagine Darwin approaching his data with this dangerous idea in mind: how is it possible to cxplain the development of species
without bringing God's special acts into our account? He then generates his
novel explanatory idca.
Historically, Darwin's project docs secm to tit this dcscription; Darwin
did make a conscious and deliberate effort 10 find fully naturalistic explanations of life-fonns, and consistently rcpudiated any attempt to bring God
into the picture to supplement his theory. I Ie viewed appeals to God as
obstructing science and standing in the way of finding natural causes.
Further, these naturalistic explanations were supposed to explain everything
pertaining-to the development of species that God's acts ofspecial creation
I Phillip E. Johnson, HRcsponsc 10 113~kcr." Chm/wn Sd",lar~ Review 22 (1993): 298.
This article is a responloC to Wilham Ila,kcr's paper "Mr. Johnson for thc Prosecution,"
ChrlSliall Scholar ~ Rn'iew 21 (1992); 177-86.
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purported to explain, making the latter explanation of these phenomena
otiose. Writing to Lyell shortly after the publication of the Origin, he states.
"I would give nothing for the theory of Natural Selection, if it requires
miraculous additions at anyone stage of descent." And to Lyell again, two
years later: "The view that each variation has been providentially arranged
seems to me to make Natural Selection entirely superfluous, and indeed
takes the whole case of the appearance of new species out of the range of
science."6 And so on this interpretation, Darwin meant his theory to exclude
God in so far as he conceived and offered it as an alternative naturalistic
hypothesis that was supposed to displace the God-hypothesis. 7
But if we thus interpret Darwin's commitment to naturalism as the ruling out of the theistic hypothesis, (and perhaps of all supernatural hypotheses), thereby delimiting the range of alternative hypotheses. it remains
unclear why Johnson thinks of Darwin's selected hypotheses (chance variation cum natural selection) as deductions from his initial ruling out The only
thing that follows from Darwin's initial abandonment of theism is that he is
bound to find some nontheistic alternative explanation-one that will be
incompatible with theism in some respect. Darwin's initial ruling out is
indeed the starting point of his search for an alternative. but it is odd to think
of it as a premise or even as an assumption from which the alternative theory is derived.' Darwin sought to replace one hypothesis with another which
he thought made better sense of the evidence at hand, including the extensive observational evidence that he collected. His theory cannot be dismissed on the philosophical grounds that it is derived from a prior commitment to finding an alternative to an hypothesis that he deemed incorrect. It
must be judged, like any other theory in science, on the basis of its overall
explanatory adequacy.

• Quoted by Neal Gilbpie. Charh'f Darwin ami the Problem of Creation (Chicago:
University of Chicago Pre&\, 1979), 120. GillespIe comments on thIS theme: "It is sometimes
saId that Darwin eonverll.-d the SCIentific world to evolution by showing them the process by
which it has occurred. Yet the unca~y reservations about natural selection among Darwin's contemporaries and the widc:;.prcnd rejeclion or It from the 1890's to the 1930's suggest that thIS is
too simple B view of the malter. It was more Darwin's insistence on totally natural explanations
than on natural selection that won thcir adherence" (146).
I Of course subsequent CvolulionaJY scientislS may be differently rnoUvatoo than Darwin
was. It may nol even occur to them to con~ciou&ly and deliberately resist supernatural causes in
part because Darwin's theory has succeeded in replaell1g Ihe old paradigm, and also because the
naturalistic principle has become so entrenched in science that it is just taken for granted.
• "Darwimsts know that the mutation-selection mechanism can produce wings, eyes, and
brains not because the mechanism can be observed to do anything of the kind, but because their
guiding philosophy assures them that no other power is available to do tbe job. The absence
from the cosmos of any Creator is therefore the essentialstartmg-poillt for Darwinism" (DT,
117, emphasis added).
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To take this o!lj"~lilln a lolep funh"'r, we mighl compare Darwin's rejeclion oflheistic ex.rl;lnallun .. tu t:il"tdn's al1anduning urthe ether as partially explanatory of Ihe rnollllO IIf phy,ic:tI budll:s in !>pace. In his special theory of relati\·ity, Einlotdn excluded Ihe c:llu:r (and any similar substance)
from Ihe physical principles and wncepls he used (0 explain the movement
of light panicles and boJies in 'pace .lnd lime. It would be absurd for a critic of Einstein's theory to c;,11 intl) qu.:,tion ,ha' ,heory on the grounds that it
had ruled OUI the ether hypothe,is frum Ihe start, and thaI we only have reason· to Ihink thaI tho'ic principles are (empirically) true because we have
m3de the: inilial a'iSUmptlUll that there: i.. no other explanatory construct
available 10 do the job:
But we arc stilllell wilh Johnloon's claim Ihal Ihe naluralistic principle
that exclUdes God ilnd :111 supematurdl powers is itself pure philosophy. If
that assumplion is a priori and ilrbitr;lry, then nhy should scientists continue
to maintain it? Why. he a:.ks. is iI simply laken for granted that life·forms
have only naturalistic callses. and not supernaturalistic ones? What is the
justification of that exclusion'! For the moment, let us leave open this challenge about the stat liS :md jUlotificatilln of the naturalistic principle that rules
out God. noting only the peculiarity of a principle that says that certain kinds
of explanations are "or allowable. In a liller section. we will sec that Pennock
concedes that science docs make such an assumption, but, he will argue,
supernatural beings are kept out of science for sound methodological rea·
sons, and so the assumption is not arbitrary.
At this point in the discllssion, we may well ask why life·forms cannot
have both the naturalistic causes that science ascribes to them and a supernatural cause. TllCiJ/ic emllll;otli.I·I... accept the process of evolution as sci·
cnce describes it. but argue that a creator-God is needed as the being who
explains the whole evolutionary process. God institutes evolutionary laws
and in some way also guides the process toward the end that he envisions.
The suggestion would seem to be one that Johnson would favor since
he also speaks orthe theistic God as guiding the process in order to further
his purposes. But in fact. Johnson adamantly opposes this compatibilist
view on the grounds that there is an "inherent conflict between Darwinism
and theism:"llowcvcr. since he also maintains that "God can work through
natural processes that arc accessible to scientific investigation including
mutation and natural selection:' we may wonder why there is a fundamental conflict between the two theories. II Part of the answer is that Johnson
believes that naturalism will not allow that God is active in the process. But
that by itself docs not mean that God could not usc Darwin's evolutionary
, Thanks to the ammymlllllo n:f.::n:e whll'ol: commcnt'
argumenl and 10 which the lahl two pnragl'llph~ nrc II "-'Ply.
,. Jol\l\o.on, "Respl1nM: \l' Ila:-l..cr." 297.
" Ibid., 29M.
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mechanism to create. Another reason Johnson gives cuts deeper, namely that
it is impossible to split off the (metaphysical) rejection of God from the rest
of evolutionary theory.
Metaphysics and science are inseparably entangled in [evolutionary
theory]. I think that most theistic evolutionists accept as scientific the
claim that natural selection perfunned the creating, but would like to
reject the accompanying metaphysical doctrine that the scientific
understanding of evolution excludes design and purpose. The problem with this way of dividing things is that the metaphysical statement is no mere embellishment but the essential foundation for the
scientific claim. (DT, 168)

Here the strong claim is advanced that the metaphysics (exclusion of God)
and the science are "inseparably entangled" so that we cannot simply dissociate the theory from its antitheistic premise and then invoke God as a cause
at a higher level. A conflict between the theory and the God-hypothesis will
inevitably arise. But what is it about Darwin's theory that conflicts with the
God of theism? Johnson must identify the points of tension or conflict ifhe
is to argue successfully against theistic evolutionism.
What Johnson typically says in this sort of context is that Darwinists
claim that evolution is "a purposeless and undirected process that produced
mankind accidentally" or that we owe our existence to "a blind materialistic
process"-as if it were obvious that such a process could not be consistent
with God's purposeS.1 2 We want to know why an intelligent God could not
make use of random processes and material forces to create the varieties of
life on earth.
In the essay from which the above phrases were taken. Johnson develops further the idea behind the conflict he sees by bringi!1g to bear some
additional theologically-based arguments aimed at showing that "attempts to
accommodate theism and Darwinism are inherently futile. "I] In one of these
arguments he explains why a process that includes chance variations and
accidental results conflicts with the Christian theistic God, and why it is very
unlikely that God used such a method:
Darwinistic evolution would be a most peculiar creative method for
God to choose, given the Darwinistic insistence that biological evolution was undirected. That requirement means that God neither programmed evolution in advance nor stepped in from time to time to
pull it in the right direction. How then did God ensure that humans
would comc into existence so that salvation history would have a
chance to oceur?'4
" Philhp E. Johnson, ''Crealor or Bhnd Watchmaker?" Firs' Things, January 1993, 8-9.
"Ibid., 14.
"Ibid., 12.

174

PIULOSOPIfIA CHRISTl

1 believe that this ide:. that. if c\'olution;II'Y theory is true, humans might not
have come into existence can he d..:\ clupcd in a way that brings out a serious conflict between e\'olution and theism.
In a recent discussion (If Darwin, the social historian Louis Menand
emphasizes the central role that chance plays in Darwin's theory. He writes,
"[wJhat was radical about 011111(' Origill ofS(I(·("i(·.f was not its evolutionism.
but ... something evcn his most lo)'al disciples were reluctant to admit,
which is that the specics-including hum.m beings-were created by, and
evolve according to, proceslocs Ihat are entircly natural, chance-generated.
and blind."!! In order to establi~h this, D.u\\'in had to develop wbat amounted to a whole new way of thinking. To begin, part of Darwin's novel strate·
gy was that he focused on the ,lifj,·t"!.·I/(·C.f between particular organisms
rather than the similarities that enabled them 10 be grouped into fixed kinds
or types. For example, he noticed \'ariations in the length or thickness of a
bird's beak: These individlml dincrcnees were selected by nature if they
gave the organism an adaptive advantage over its competitors in the struggle for survival.
The process of natural selection is Mind in two ways. First, the variations that are selected are oncs the individual just happens to have. Darwin
saw variations always occurring in naturc's regenerative processes, and took
. them to be an unexplained given in hi~ system. lie claimed that these variations were produccd by dlCmC'e in the sense that thcy were unpredictable, not
that they were uncaused or indcterminate.
Secondly. nalural selection is a blind process "because the conditions to
which the individual organism must adapi in ordcr to survive are never the
same."" The conditions that the individual happens to meet are the ones that
happen to be there, and Ihese too are unpredictable. And out of this fortuitous coming together of individual difference and external circumstance, an
evolutionary change may occur. Menand illustrates the process as follows:
Darwin thought ... that variations occur by chance, and that chance
determines their adaptive utility. In all ~ea,«ms it happens that some
finches arc born with marginally longer and narrower beaks than others, just as children of the same parents aTe not all exactly the same
height. In e~ain environmental condltiono;, a narrower beak may have
positive or negative survival value, but in lither conditions-for example, when seeds are plentiful and finches arc few-it may make no difference. The ''selection'' of ["vorable characteristics is therefore neither designed n01 pmgrClosivc. No intelligence, divine or otherwise.
determines in advance the relative vllluc of individual variatIOns.•..
"Louis Menllnd, 77,.. 1II"'''I,Jr.l'.''("(/{ ('11111 (NI.'W York: Farrar. Straus and Giroull, 2001). I'll.
"Ibid., 122.
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Natural selection is a law that explains why changes occur in nature,
[and] how changes occur in nature. But natural selection does not dictate what those changes shall be. It is a process without mind....
Evolution is simply the incidental by-product of material struggle, not
its goal. Organisms don't struggle because they must evolve; they
evolve because they must struggle. 17

In such a chance-driven process, there is no guarantee that any particular
species (including humans) will evolve.
In his 1989 book. Wondetful Life, Stephen Jay Gould developed an
interpretation of Darwin similar to Menand's that emphasizes what he calls
the ''massive historical contingency" of evolution and leads to a similar conclusion.· 1 Based on his study of the anatomical features of the fifteen to
twenty different organisms in the Burgess Shale. Gould concludes that a scientific observer could not have predicted which of them would be survivors
and which losers in the subsequent mass extinctions. The ones that survived
were the ones favored by Lady Luck. Here is how he describes the contingency of the overall process:
The divine tape player holds a million scenarios, each perfectly sensible. Little quirks at the outset, occurring for no particular reason
unleash cascades of consequences that make a particular future seem
inevitable in retrospect. But the slighest early nudge contacts a different groove, and history veers into another plausible channel, diverging continually from its original pathway. The end results are so different, the initial perturbation so apparently trivlal. I '

And regarding the ascendancy of mammals he writes:
If mammals had arisen late and helped to drive dinosaurs to their
doom, then we could legitimately propose a scenario of expected
progress. But dinosaurs remained dominant and probably became
extinct only as a quirky result of the most unpredictable of aU
events-a mass dying triggcred by extraterrestrial impact. If
dmosaurs had not died in this event, they would probably still dominate the domain of large-bodied vertebrates, as they had for so long
with such conspicuous success, and mammals would still be small
creatures in the interstices of their world. This situation prevailed for
a hundred million years: why not for sixty million more? Since
dinosaurs were not moving toward markedly larger brains, and since
such a prospect may lie outside the capabilities of reptilian design, we
"Ibid., 122-3.
Stephen Jay Gould, WOIrJ(·rful L,((': 17,(, Burges., Shale and the Nahlrr! a/History (New
York: W. W. Norton. 1989), 233.
10 Ibid., 320-1.
II
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musl assume that consciousness woulLi nol have evolved on our planet ira cosmic cata~trophe haLl not claimed the dinosaurs as victims. In
an entirely literal sen~e, we owe tlUr cxi~lence, as large and reasoning
mammals, to our lucky lotars.'"

Returning to Johnson's theological argument, since God had in mind a
plan for humans, namely that he would take the form of a human, Jesus,
who would die on the cross to redeem them from their sins, then he would
. not have created a natural process that left it genuinely open whether
humans would evolve. At least it would seem an imperfect plan to will that
the divine nature take on human form if the very existence of any humans
depended on small unpredictable quirks and nudges in the evolutionary
process he initiated.
But perhaps it was left genuinely open whether humans would evolve,
but God. who is all-knowing, created a world in which he foresaw that
humans would in fact evolve by chance. The emergence of humans would
be unpredictable on the ba!>is of natural factors, and only predictable if we
could know the creator's mind. But there is a theological problem with this
compatibilist solution. It seems to make God a deceiver. If God created a
world that gives every indication to a rational observer of being one in which
chance reigns, when in fact the process is moving toward a preconceived
goal, would not Ihis be at Ihe very Icast misleading to our inquiring minds?
So Johnson is right that there is a serious tension here; it is unlikely that the
theistic God, who is not a deceiver, would have created a process that left
open "a million scenarios, each perfectly sensible," or even a few scenarios,
unless each and every one of them led to the appearance of intelligent human
beings on earth.
It is important to sec that Johnson docs not think of the conflict between
evolution and theism in terms of /ogim/ incompatibility. Evolutionary principles are not strictly incompatible with Christian theism. God could have
used Darwin's mechanism of chance variations and natural selection to create, but Johnson thinks it is unlikely that he did (for both theological and
empirical reasons). Thus the opposition between evolution and theism is put
in terms of its being impl'Obah/e that both arc true. The logical relation is that
if evolution is true, then certain claims about, for example, the Christian God
are likely to be false and would have to be revised or abandoned; and if theism is true, then some basic principles of evolution arc probably false and
will have to be revised or abandoned.
,. Ibid., 31 R. Gould view~ the fate of 1/""'(1 ,1CI1'/('nf II~ cqUIIlly precanous: "[Wle are an
improbable and fragile en Illy, fonunalcly ~ucce~,ful after prcc'lriou~ begmmngs as a small population m Africa, nol the predictllble end resuh ofa globallcndcncy.... Run the tape again, and
let the tiny twig of l/ollllJ .frlph·,/,f expire m Africa. Olher homimds may have stood on the
thre~hold of what we know 11& human p,,,,ibllilic~. but many scn~ible scenarios would never
generate our level of menlillity" (lIl-JIIJ<,t;fill Li/I!, 319-20)
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This brings us to what I call Johnson's solution to the conflict between
science and religion. It involves two additional aims. First. the theistic God
(intelligent designer) should be brought into science. and considered along.
side of evolutionary theory as a legitimate alternative. Johnson anticipates
that if this is done, then the God-hypothesis will prove to be the better scientific theory; that is, it will be found to be more in accord with the observable evidence (such as the fossil record) than evolutionary theory. and thus
be more acceptable than its rival by science's own standards. And second,
Johnson's larger aim is to illtegrate science and religion by way of a unified
scientific theory that has a place for a designer-God who superintends the
natural realm and the human beings that inhabit it. For this reason, he resists
any attempt to exclude God from influencing nature by assigning God's
actions and interventions to another "spiritual" realm separate from the natural realm.
Let us look more closely at Johnson's claim that God should be brought
into science. How exactly is this supposed to work? Pennock takes up this
question in his section "The Prospects for a Supernatural 'Theistic Science'"
(TD. 294) where he argues that the prospects are not good. It is a mistake,
Pennock thinks, to try to "naturalize" God, to make God part of the sort of
explanatory account that science constructs, to make God a scientific construct. To do so is to "do a disservice to both religion and science" (TB, 206).
Pennock sets up a dilemma for any proposal for a theistic science: "If
one takes God to be supernatural, then God and the Creation hypothesis
have no place in science. On the other hand, if one naturalizes god to make
the Creation hypothcsis scicntific, then we find ourselves faced with a God
who is not very godly" (TO, 308). Let us consider first the second hom of
the dilemma.
As Pennock sees it, Johnson's approach does a disservice to religion
because it makes God into a finite object. which conflicts with the traditional theistic idea of God as transcendent and holy. But I do not see that
Johnson is in any danger of compromising God's transcendence and making
God into a natural object. Johnson's main contention is that the God-hypothesis explains obscrvable facts; it is no more integrally connected with empirical data than that. And even if the God-hypothesis is supposed to be on a
scientific par with other naturalistic hypotheses qua explanatory construct, it
is different from them preciscly because it invokes a supernatural cause.
However Pennock is forcing the question of how the God-hypothesis is
supposed to function in science, Johnson might reply that it functions as a
guiding principle much as it did for Newton and Paley. God as intelligent
creator sets up boundary conditions in nature. God creates an orderly world
in which all or most things have some reason for being as they are. Scientists
who investigate the world can expect to find those reasons. To be sure,
Johnson is willing to put God to the test in the head-la-head competition that
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he em'isions, and some believers may think that this act alone is irreverent
But Johnson would defend against this religiously-based objection by citing
scripture: If God's creative act is "clearly perceh'ed in the things that have
been made" (R(lman~ I :20). then there should be plcnty of observable evidence in nature to support this belief. and there can be nothing unholy about
using it to establish the designer hypothesis.
If Johnson will not be gored on the second horn of Pennock's dilemma.
ifhe retains God as a supernatural being, transcendent and outside of nature,
what about the first horn: if one takes God to be supernatural, then God and
the Creation hypothesis have no place in science? Pennock has a twopronged argument 10 back up his claim that God and the creationist hypothesis have no place in !'>cience, The first is that God's actions and interventions into the natural realm arc not I(',flah/e in a broad sense of that term (to
be explained). And sccond, the acts or etTects of supernatural beings and
powers arc by delinition cOIllrOl), to loU'. and as such fall outside the boundarics of scientific explanation. Let us examine each of these arguments.
First, Pennock qucstions whether any of three central claims Johnson
makes about the Christian theistic God t1re testable-thnt God performs specific (I('/S in nature, that God directly ('alllro/,r nature, and that God's acts further his purpos('S, Regarding the second claim that God directly controls
nature, Pennock asks: how docs God intervene to controt the process ofthe
origin of species? what is the causal process that God acts on or through?
For example, docs God create (as some theologians have maintained) by
causing the variations upOn which selection occurs'! or by selecting the variations that will survi\'e'! How would we know that God had acted in that
way? "May theistic science appeal to ex "iIIi/o miracles or other miraculous
control processes'!': (TB, 298),
Regarding the other two claims, Pennock maintains that there is no
clear-cut empirical procedure or test for identifying some observed phenomenon as the result of God's act or intention. But science requires that all
theoretical constructs must be tied more or less directly to observable verifying procedures, In contrast to the Creation hypothesis. "[tJhe Darwinian
view holds that the evolutionary processes arc working all the time, and can
point to observations thereof. We can observe mutation. recombination,
inheritance, natural selection, and the resultant changes in gene frequencies
in popUlations" (TB, 297). In putting his challenge in this way, Pennock is
not espousing naive verification ism. He realizes that the absence of clear-cut
tcsts that would verify (or falsify) are not sufficient grounds for ruling out a
hypothesis. But he is bringing out the fact that any theoretical principle must
have a closer connection to empiricat observable fact than Johnson and
Intelligent Design theorists seem to realize. It must be tied to a large number of spccific observable or experimental contexts (sets of data) and explain
those specific data as well as, or better than, rival hypotheses and theories,
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When Pennock states that "we can observe mutation. recombination. inheritance. natural selection, and the resultant changes in gene frequencies in
populations." he is pointing to the close connection between these theoretical constructs in evolutionary theory and spccific sets of correlated data. The
general principles of evolution get tied to these data indirl'Ctly by way of
organizing and explaining these intermediate constructs. When Pennock
asks how we would identify. rccognilc, know about. any of God's particular
actions or purposes, he is pointing out that the God-hypothesis gives us
nothing like the evolutionary explanatory system that links gencral principles to specific sets of data via intermediate lower-Ie\'el constructs. Thus the
theistic hypothesis falls far short of its ri\'al in rc!.pcct of one crucial test of
empirical adequacy in science. namely, Ihe "'IIIlh£'r unci "ariel), 0/ killds 0/
data that it can accoullt/or.:!
This argument based on the empirical adequacy of design hypotheses
has, I believe considerable force again!.t thei!llic science, but it still leaves
the door to science open a crack for theism; for theistic hypotheses might
still be admissible in science if they Can be made tC!llable in the broad sense
I have described. Pennock tries to close ofT this pos!oibility with another line
of argument aimed at keeping the thcilotie God out of science altogether. Put
simply. the argument is that any explanation Ihat appeals to a .'fll"ertratllrai
being is contrary to the very essence of ~cicncc "hich ;s to explain narural
phenomena in terms of lawful regularities.
The importance of lawfulness in gh"ing Iocicnti fie explanations is
revealed in this passage:
Empiriealtcsting relics fundamentally 1I(llln the lawful regularities of
nature whieh science has been able to Lh..clwer and !>ol11etimes codify
in natural laws. For exam(lle. tebco(lie (lh"eT\"ations implicitly
depcnd upon the laws go\eming optical phenomena. If we could not
rely upon thesc laws-if. for example. c,"cn '" hcn under the samc
conditions, telescopes occa~;onally mag11lficd (lroperly and at other
occasions produced \"arious dl\lortlOn'l dependent liay. 11pon the
whims of some !>upematural Cnllty-wc could not trust telescopIc
observations as cvidencc .... But wilho\lllhe Clm\traint of lawful regularity. inductive evidential infercnce cal1not gct ofT the ground. (T8,
194-5)

" If it is argued 1hat1he intelligent de"gn h) ('C'IIII:'" ma\r.c, [(lhen-Ill Ihe ,\\.11 (If 1,,\\ ·lc\.:1
and hypolheses Ihal Pennock mcnUIIII, (.llUllhcn- arc I11dny (1lhl.'''' he ..hll:\ n,,1 men·
tion) as well as evolutionary principles. f \\,.uld 11.'1'1) lh.\I flll!.'!!!!;!!:nl fk"!gn Ihcllrl,l\ l11u,1
undertake Ihis ta~k orunillng all or mllSt oflhcc,c llllTerenl LlIld, "f.1.113 un.ler IhclT h}J"Il'lhcM'
before it can be considered by science II~ II n\o.l h),I'Olh':'I'"
construct~
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The author goes tm 10 !>:ly that thill is thc r.llionale for scientists making "the
melhodoh)gical as·mrnpllun th.lt loupcmaturJI enllties do not intervene to
negate la\\ tul n;llurJl rcgul.uitk~" (7"11, lIJS).
It is notc\\onhy Ihal Ihere i.. a !toOlc\\hal technical meaning of superIICllllrtll at play in Ihi .. dl"l:ulo.,inn. In a uloeful seclion on "Supernatural
Explanalums," loupemalurill agenls and rowers arc chal'ilcteriZC<i as being
(I) "above :md bc)'und the nalur.ll w,Irld"; (2) "inherenlly mysterious to us"
because "(ah n:llur.11 bdng'i, ,Iur knu"lcdgc all comcs \'ia natural laws and
processes": and (3) "nllt cuntrollahle by humans" (TR. 289-90). Each of
these propertic.. seel11'; c:llcul:lted to take supcrn:uural beings out of the
sphere of lociencc :lI1d uliT natural kl1(l\\ Icdge. The acts or effects of supernatural being" un the 'M'Tld arc \·jcwcd by I'ennock as having no natural
causes and hence a... (cuntr.lcau!>;!I) \'iuIOltiuns of nature's laws.
In this way, I'cnnuck atlelllpls 10 delivcr a knockout {lunch, designed to
show that divine causes can bc excluded frmn science as belonging to a class
of causes thaI !lcicncc cannol deal with. But Pennock's argument fails, I
belicve, because it depends un his definitions of the concepts of scientific
exp!cmatiOIl and of Ih" .1l1/"'l'twt,,,.t11 which, in Ihc end, amount to a stipulation that there is a boundary around the natural world that science investigates. and that God and other supernatural beings cannot cross it.
But the definitions arc tm) rel>lrictivc. In the first place, on the side of
scientific explanation and ul1der~landing, Pennock overcstimates the role of
law and lawful regularities in giving naturalistic explanations. Scientists do
not always explain events by subsuming them under laws. And in evolutionary biology it is hardly ever the ca~e that e\'ents arc explained by finding laws that cover them. As we have seen. D:lrwin cxplained evolutionary
changes <in part) by appealing to chance \'ariations as a basic principle that
was contrary to law. Ch'lIlee variations were indeed couched in a wider context of lawful regularities. but Goo's interventions could be so as well.
Further. Gould has cmphasiled the contingency and nonrepeatability of
some evolutionary changes, implying that evolutionary laws cannot account
for the success ofsol11c organisms and the failure of others. He advocates the
model of hi.~/o,.icCiI explanations in biology thaI "take the fonn of narrative."
A historical explanation is ba!>ed nn the rrinciple of contingency and "does
not rest on direct deductions from laws of nature, but on an unpredictable
sequence of antecedent states, \\ here any major change in any step of the
sequence would have altered the final result.":: Although Gould is holding
onto the idea of causality in historical explanations, perhaps even causality of
the dctenninistie kind, it is clear that these explanations do not refer to any
lawful regularities or rcpeatable events.ll It may be that divine explanations
" GOlIlll, IJ;}III/l'I:fi11 l.ifi·. 2113.
" Philip Kitchel' PIII~ (orw;m.llhc bimilar Idea Ihal evululiollilry theorisls Iypically construct
"Darwinian hi.\tol'lcs" II~ a I'l'lJhlcm-~III\lmg 'Irmegy 10 c,,-plain evollliionary changes. See
Ahll.~illg Sd"ne," Till! ell It" u~ai".~, Ot'III;"II/I/II (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 1982),50-2.
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would not fit into Gould's model of explanations in biology any better than
they fit into Pennock's, (we would still have the problem of how we could
know that one of the contingencies that led to an event was God's intervening act); but if they did not, it would not be because they involved violations
of nature's laws.
And on the side of the supernatural cause, it is not clear that God's
interventions would necessarily "violate" or "negate" natural laws, as
Pennock strongly suggests. God could intervene in nature at the level of
human affairs and decisions, inducing changes in human minds which could
then have a downward causal effect on underlying coordinate physical
events. Or God might intervene at the physical level, somehow influencing
probabilistic events for example, thus effecting changes in human experience from the bottom up. Although the how of these interventions would
have to be specified more precisely, my point is that it is an open question
whether they would involve violations of nature's laws (especially if those
laws are not detenninistic). Compare how it is with human agents. There is
an ongoing debate about how to fit human agents and their actions into a
material world. Are human (mental) volitions reducible to physical states of
the brain? Or are they not reducible to, but "supervenient" on, those states?
If the latter, are they capable of influencing the physical states that sub serve
them? And if they can influence those underlying physical states, how can
they do so without violating the laws that govern them?
I am not trying to resolve these latter issues, but simply pointing to the
fact that they are open questions in the philosophy of mind and body.
Cognitive scientists may not be very receptive to the idea that something that
may be conceived as outside our neurological systems-a conscious mental
state-might affect something inside that system, but some at least have
tried to fonnulate a model of how this might occur. And to my knowledge,
cognitive scientists have not invoked a methodological naturalist principle
that wholly rules out any such speculation. But if philosophers of mind can
speculate about how human minds might influence their bodies and the
world without overturning science, theologians might also think about how
God might influence the world, perhaps in similar ways, without transgressing the rules of science.
There is a deeper problem here about dividing supernatural powers and
forces from natural ones by drawing a sharp boundary between them, and
then restricting our knowledge, as natural beings, to the natural realm. The
problem is that there is no natural boundary between the natural sphere
(accessible to our rational minds) and the supernatural sphere (inherently
mysterious to us). We have to make such a boundary, and I do not see any
way of doing so without arbitrarily deciding which sorts of possible causes
we want to keep out of science and beyond the limits of our natural knowledge. We will say that these causes are inherently mysterious, or that there
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is no way for us to detect them, or that there is no agreed-upon method for
verifying them. But there is no way for nacuralists to eliminate any class of
causes from possible consideration by science. All that methodological naturalists can do at any point in the history of science is draw a line around
those hypotheses that science has been able to test in some way and distinguish them from those that science cannot yet do anything with.
Explanations in terms of divine causes are ruled out now only because we
cannot find a way to connect them with scientific explanation and its theories and empirical data in its present state. But this could change.
Another way of putting this point is that the boundaries of natural science arc fluid; for example, they arc currently being shaped and adjusted to
account forthe properties of human minds as these arc being investigated by
the cognitive and social sciences. As regards the divine mind, although I
think it unlikely that Intelligent Design hypotheses will gain entrance into
the scientific worldview, I do not sec any way of ruling this out as an impossibility except by stipulation. Further, while it is true that appeal to the principle of methodological naturalism has proved effective since the time of
Darwin and embodies \cssons that have been learned over more than a century in the competitive marketplace of scientific ideas and theories, the principle should not be absolutized, and would have to be suspended if
Intelligent Design theorists could make their hypotheses meet standards of
empirical adequacy.
What should we conclude about Johnson's solution to the contlict
between science and theism? If we accept the criticism that Intelligent
Design hypotheses lack empirical import, then we will doubt the prospects
for the kind of integrated scientific theory Johnson envisions. Intelligent
Design theorists have not made their case that there is any place in science
for a theistic hypothesis. Out if we keep God apart from the natural world as
disclosed by science. what then remains of Johnson's positive view, and in
particular his claim that we should seek an integrated theory?
r wish to propose that instead of seeking to integrate the two explanatory theories by uniting them in a single theory, theologians should seek to reconcile these accounts by making them consonant. There are several important insights that we can take from Johnson in our effort to forge a reconciling view. First, we can retain his resistance to the deistic option of reducing
God's role to creation by an initial act, followed by noninterference of any
kind in the natural process. In other words, defenders of theism should not
forget they are defending a personal, activist God.
Second, we can retain his resistance to the view that separates (the
supernatural) God from nature and Ihen assigns God's actions and interven~
tions to a spiritual realm which is not only separate from the natural realm,
but completely "walled ofT"~· from it. Science is then awarded exclusive
" Johnson uses this apt tenn in "Creator or Blind Watchmaker?" 11.

DAN D. CRAWfORD

183

authority over the natural realm. \\ In II: the spiritual realm falls under the
jurisdiction ofthe theologian or pric!ot. A second and more subtle part of this
proposal is that the natural realm is idcntilied with thl: It,tli and the ratiollal,
while the spiritual realm is judged to be unreal (or not fully real) and irrational (or not fully rational).
Pennock favors this \'iew thOlt religion bcl(lOgs to another realm. He
suggests as a viable option "that God is concerned with our spiritual rather
than our material being and thus intcf\'clles only at a spiritual level" (TB.
192). We also sec it in his endorsement of the idea of God as "mysterious
and inscrutable" (TD, 307) and the claim that "[a}5 natural beings, our
knowledge all comes "ia natural laws and processes" (T8, 290). lie goes on
to say in this passage: "The lawful regularities of our experience do not
apply to the supernatural world. If therl: are other sorts of supernatural
'laws' that govern that world, they can be nothing like those that we understand."

In another passage. he allows that when farmers' crops fail. it may be
true "that their crop failure is simply part of God's curse upon the land
because of Adam's disobedience or ... that the Lord is punishing them for
some moral offense and that it might not be fertilizer they need. but contrition and repentence." But "such spiritual possibilities fall under the purview.
oftbe priest and not the scientist" (TD. 282-3). lie goes on to say that "the
proper role of the scientist is to scarch for natural causes of such occurrences" implying that even if God is causally contributing in some way to
the poor crop. there are still (sufficient) natural causes for the event and they
will not be affectcd by whatevcr God may do. So whatever reality this shadowy spiritual realm may have. preloumably it is not one that we can know
anything about, or if we do have some kind of understanding of it. it is not
any understanding that might challenge or even conflict with scientific
knowledge.
Johnson resists this compartmentalization of science and religion. and
there are some very good rc:lsons why a theist should. First, the view ignores
the question of how the two realms arc related. It overlooks the fact that the
God who acts in the spiritual realm is also the creator of the natural realm.
And so the question has to be asked: how are these two realms part of one
creation? When, for example. God intervenes and alters persons and mental
events in the spiritual plane. would not corresponding states of those persons' brains and bodies also be altercd so that they would be in states that
they would not have been in if Glld had not acted? If there is one created
order, then there must be a (,(}IIgnl£'llc'e between the spiritual and the natural spheres. This is where Johnson's vision of an integrated theory is relevant,
now in a different sense, but also relevant is the fundamental opposition
between science and religion that he has indicated. If theism is true, as
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Johnson believes, there must be a way of hamloniling the theistic God with
the best science of ollr day. And theologians !ohould be trying to find ways of
making God's purposes nnd pru\'idenli:11 goodness congruent with what science is telling us about who we are, and the kind of physical process that
brought us to when: we arc-at lhe IUP of Ihe heap, without glossing over
the inconsonances.:·
What about the second part of Ihe two-realms view that assigns a second-class status to Ihe religious realm as far as its claim to be real and rational. Johnson of course rc!oilots this. I Ie and other intelligent design creationists may be viewed as rcfu'iing to cede tn science Ihe entire realm of the natural and Ihe rational undcT!otanding of it. As the conllict between theism and
evolutionary theory grows, the critic!! of religion sec science as gradually
shouldering God out of the picture, not simply by metaphysical or methodological fiat, but on thi: (·,'ic/e·milll ground that God is becoming more and
more implausible as an expl;mation of anything that occurs in the biological
realm. Johnson resists the inference that the theistic view is the more
improbable one, and that the onu .. falls on thei!lom to make compromises and
concessions to science. Convinced of the truth of theism. he concludes that
there must be something wrong \\ ith the evolutionary side of the argument.
-that evolutionary theory has gouen ''(In the wmng track and needs to be
brought back to reality."" lie bclicn~s as theists must believe that science
wilt eventually change its course.'
What recommendation can W(' make to both parties in this debate. A reconciling view that docs not presume that either side is on the wrong track,
and that also recognizes Ihe opposition between them, will anticipate
changcs coming from both sides. We urge theologians to take a critical attitude toward science, identifying the points al which theological claims clash
with scientific claims and then plolting the direction Ihat science must go in
to accommodate essential theological belief.... They mu~t pick their battles:
Mind is not reducible 10 matter'? There is direction or progress in evolution?
What look like chance-based. unguided evolutionary changes are not? But
at the same time. they must be willing 10 cnntemplale fundamental changes
in their own theological systems. such as qualifying God's attributes of
omnipotence or omniscience. And !>cience, for its part, should be receptive
to this critical function of theology, recognizing 1hat novel hypotheses that
challenge old paradigms can come from any quarter.

" I am alluding here nnt ollly til the c,"lIm~cncy elf Ihe: prncC"'o' "c",n(,cd Dhc.l\e:. but also 10
the: siruggle for e:)lj,tcIlCC a11l11hc: unlnld dc,lruClilln lind \\a,le: Ihal allc:nd~ it.
I- 10hno,on,

··Crealor or nhnd W..lo:hmal..c(r· 1.$.

